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JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review the order of 
the Industrial Commission pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §35-1-86. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The Petitioner has only presented three issues for review. 
First, did the Industrial Commission apply the appropriate 
standard of review of the administrative law judges decisions. This 
is an issue of law and is reviewed under a correction of error 
standard. Morton Intl., Inc. v. Auditing Division, 814 P.2d 581 
(Utah, 1991) 
Second, was the decision of the Commission supported by the 
facts. This is a factual determination which is reviewed under a 
substantial evidence standard. Ashcroft vs. Industrial Commissionr 
885 P.2d 267 (Utah App. 1993) 
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Third, was Petitioner denied due process by either the 
administrative law judges delay in rendering a decision or the 
review afforded by the Industrial Commission. This is a question 
of law and reviewed under a correction of error standard. Morton 
Intl.r Inc. v. Auditing Division, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah, 1991) 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
The following are determinative statues which are set out in 
their entirety in the addendum to this brief. 
Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-16(g) 
Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-8 
Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-10 
Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-12 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an Appeal from an Order of the Utah Industrial 
Commission. 
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On December 31, 1991 Petitioner filed an Application for 
Hearing with the Industrial Commission of Utah requesting medical 
expenses, permanent, partial and temporary partial disability 
compensation, interest, travel expenses and permanent and total 
disability. A hearing was held before an administrative law judge 
on June 12, 1992. The petitioner was present and represented by an 
attorney. The employer was present through its insurer and 
represented by an attorney and the Employers Reinsurance Fund was 
represented by its administrator and attorney. After the hearing 
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the Administrative Law Judge entered Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and an Order which were dated November 20, 1992. 
This Order denied petitioner's application and found that there was 
no compensable industrial accident. Petitioner, through her 
attorney, filed a timely Motion for Review of the Administrative 
Law Judge's order with the Utah Industrial Commission. On the 2nd 
day of April, 1993 The Utah Industrial Commission issued its Order 
Denying Motion for Review. Petitioner subsequently filed her 
Notice of Appeal with the Utah Court of Appeals. 
The Utah Court of Appeals on Motion of Petitioner and 
stipulation of the parties remanded the matter back to the 
Industrial Commission on the 28th day of October, 1993 for the 
limited purpose of determining whether the Petitioner had shown by 
a preponderance of evidence that she was entitled to compensation. 
The Industrial Commission entered its Order on Remand finding that 
petitioner had not shown she had suffered an industrial accident by 
a preponderance of the evidence and once again sustained the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Administrative Law 
Judge. 
DISPOSITION AT AGENCY 
The Industrial Commission of Utah has upheld the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law of its Administrative Law Judge which 
found that no compensable industrial accident occurred to 
petitioner. 
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RELEVANT FACTS 
The following are the facts relevant to this case with 
appropriate citations to the record: 
1. Petitioner was an employee of the Tooele Valley Regional 
Medical Center.(Transcript pg. 8) 
2. Petitioner had a history of problems with her right 
shoulder and right arm extending back at least three years prior to 
July 15, 1991. (Transcript pgs. 24-26, 47-51) 
3. Petitioner had been receiving medical treatment for her 
shoulder prior to July 15, 1991. (Transcript pgs. 24-26, 47-51) 
4. Petitioner suffered an industrial injury to her lower back 
in April, 1991. (Transcript pg. 51) 
5. Petitioner applied to her employer's insurance company for 
medical benefits for an operation to her shoulder under her claim 
from her industrial accident of April, 1991. (Transcript pg. 51 & 
105) 
6. The insurance company denied coverage to her for the 
shoulder since the claim was for an injury to her back. (Transcript 
pg. 106) 
7. After denial of the benefits, petitioner reported that she 
had suffered a second industrial accident on July 15, 1991 which 
injured her shoulder. (Transcript pg. 105) 
8. Petitioner had left work July 15, 1991 complaining of pain 
in her shoulder. (Transcript pg. 21) 
9. Petitioner did not report to her supervisor when leaving 
4 
work on July 15th that she had suffered an industrial accident. 
(Transcript pgs. 123, 124-131) 
10. Petitioner did not report the alleged industrial accident 
of July 15, 1991 until after the medical procedure on her shoulder 
had been denied under her April, 1991 industrial accident. 
(Transcript pgs. 115-120) 
11. Petitioner was released by her doctors to return to work 
on November 4, 1991, but chose to retire on November 10, 1991. 
(Transcript pgs. 135-136, 139) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Industrial Commission has applied the appropriate standard 
of review. Although there is some confusion in the Industrial 
Commission's first Order Denying Motion for Review, the Industrial 
Commission now has clearly applied the appropriate standard and has 
found that petitioner did not prove that she had a compensable 
injury by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Petitioner was not denied due process of law by the delay in 
receiving a decision from the Administrative Law Judge since she 
suffered no prejudice as a result of the delay. 
The decision of the Industrial Commission of Utah and the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Administrative Law 
Judge should be upheld by this Court. The Administrative Law Judge 
found that the petitioner, Jennie Featherstone, had failed to show 
by a preponderance of credible evidence that an industrial accident 
occurred on July 15, 1991, and therefore, she was not entitled to 
Workers Compensation benefits. The Findings of Fact that lead to 
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this conclusion are all supported by evidence contained within the 
record. The evidence which the Administrative Law Judge discounted 
was based upon the credibility of the witnesses. Issues of 
credibility should be left to the trier of fact to determine. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The Industrial Commission did apply the proper 
standard of review of the Administrative Law 
Judge's decision. 
Petitioner has argued in her Brief that the Industrial 
Commission misapplied the standard of review in looking at the 
Administrative Law Judge's decision. She relies on the case of 
Ashcroft vs. Industrial Commission, 885 P.2d 267 (Utah App. 1993). 
In Ashcroft the Court of Appeals held that there is a distinction 
between the standard preponderance of evidence and substantial 
evidence, and that this difference is significant. The Court 
explained that a reviewing body, such as this Court, applies the 
standard of substantial evidence to examine whether the record 
contains evidence supporting the findings made by the trier of 
fact. The reviewing court does not weigh the evidence. In 
contrast, a trier of fact, including the Commission, determines 
whether the Petitioner has met his or her burden, the standard 
being preponderance of the evidence. Ashcroft at page 269. 
While some confusion existed as to whether or not the 
Industrial Commission misapplied these standards of review, this 
Matter was remanded back to the Industrial Commission to resolve 
this alleged error. The Order on Remand clearly applies the 
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appropriate standard. The Industrial Commission found: 
For the reasons outlined above, we find that the 
Applicant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that she injured her right shoulder in a 
compensable industrial accident on July 15, 1991. 
The Industrial Commission has now specifically applied the 
appropriate standard of review to the Administrative Law Judge's 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Petitioner's argument now 
is clearly without merit. 
POINT II 
The decision of the Industrial Commission 
of Utah and its Administrative Law Judge 
should be sustained by the Court when the 
issue turns on credibility of evidence and 
witnesses. 
Findings of Fact of the Utah Industrial Commission should be 
upheld by this Court unless the determination of fact is not 
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record before the Court. (See Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-16(4)(g)) In 
this matter the Utah Industrial Commission in adopting the Findings 
of the Administrative Law Judge has determined that Petitioner's 
shoulder was not injured in an industrial accident on July 15, 
1991. Petitioner is now challenging these Findings in the Court of 
Appeals. In order to successfully challenge these Findings, it is 
necessary that the Petitioner marshall all of the evidence 
supporting the Findings and show that despite the facts in support 
of the Findings and in light of the conflicting or contradictory 
evidence the Findings are not supported by substantial evidence. 
Merriam vs. Board of Review, 812 P. 2d 447, (Utah App. 1991). Since 
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Petitioner's Brief does not marshall all of the evidence in support 
of the Industrial Commission's finding that no industrial accident 
occurred and then make a showing from the record that the factual 
determination was unsupported this Court should accept the findings 
of the Industrial Commission. 
Respondent admits that there is evidence in the record 
contradictory to the evidence that no industrial accident occurred, 
but the trier of fact determined that this evidence either did not 
support the contentions of Petitioner or lacked credibility. There 
is substantial evidence to support the findings of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah. These facts supported by citations to the 
record are contained in this brief's Statement of Facts and can be 
summarized as follows: Petitioner had a history of problems with 
her right shoulder which predated the alleged injury by 
approximately three years; Petitioner had expressed to her doctor 
symptoms similar to what she alleged to have been caused by the 
industrial accident prior to the industrial accident; Petitioner 
did not report the industrial accident at the time the accident was 
alleged to have occurred; Petitioner attempted to get the shoulder 
covered under a prior industrial accident claim; and Petitioner 
only reported the industrial accident after the insurance carrier 
for the employer had denied coverage for the requested treatment 
under the prior industrial accident claim. This evidence supports 
the conclusion of the Industrial Commission that no compensable 
industrial accident occurred and is substantial enough to meet the 
standard required by Utah Code Annotated §63-46b-16(4)(g). 
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The Industrial Commission's determination on credibility should 
be deferred to by this Court. As stated in Grace Drilling, v. 
Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah App. 1989): 
It is the province of the Board, not appellate courts, to 
resolve conflicting evidence, and where inconsistent 
inferences can be drawn from the same evidence, it is for 
the Board to draw the inferences.(citations omitted) 
Grace id. at 68. 
Since Petitioner has not marshalled all the facts which 
support the Boards's conclusion and which contradict her 
conclusions and has not shown the factual determination that no 
compensable industrial accident occurred to Petitioner was an 
arbitrary and unreasonable conclusion by the Industrial Commission, 
this Court should defer to the Industrial Commission's finding of 
no industrial accident. 
POINT III 
Petitioner has not been denied due process 
rights by the actions of the Industrial 
Commission. 
In her Statement of the Issues Petitioner avers that she is 
presenting for review, issues concerning whether Petitioner's due 
process rights have been denied by virtue of the Commission taking 
too long in making its Findings of Fact and whether the 
Petitioner's due process rights have been denied by virtue of the 
Commission's Findings of Fact being arbitrary, capricious and 
wholly without cause. These issues are wholly without merit. 
What is procedurally required by Industrial Commission has 
been established by the State Legislature in the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act. (Utah Code Annotated §§63-46b-8, 63-
46b-10, 63-46b-12.) The Industrial Commission has complied with 
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procedural standards in processing Petitioner's application. 
Petitioner apparently is challenging the Administrative Law Judge's 
findings of fact and is questioning the Industrial Commissions 
order on review. Both of these meet the standards required by the 
statutes referred to above, and while Utah Code Annotated §§ 63-
46b-10 requires that a decision be rendered in a reasonable time no 
specific time table is mandated. Petitioner has not cited any 
cases which would specially define what is reasonable for a 
Administrative Law Judge under circumstances similar to this matter 
and this Respondent has not found any cases on point. Petitioner 
has not alleged any substantive harm or prejudice to her because of 
the delay in making the decision. Since no prejudice to 
Petitioner's case has been shown by the delay between the hearing 
and the rendering of the decision, Petitioner's assertion of 
violation of due process rights should be ignored as a harmless 
error at most. An error is harmless if it is: 
Sufficiently inconsequential...that there is 
no reasonable likelihood that the error 
affected the outcome of the proceeding. Morton 
Intl., Inc. v. Auditing Division, 814 P.2d 581 
(Utah, 1991) at pg. 84. 
Even if the delay in the decision was longer than reasonable, 
there is no showing that it affected the outcome of this claim. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the Industrial Commission should be upheld. 
The appropriate standard of review of the Administrative Law 
Judge's Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law was employed by 
the Industrial Commission. The dispute between Petitioner and the 
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Industrial Commission's decision hinges on an interpretation of 
evidence, and the credibility of witnesses. The Findings of Fact 
of the Industrial Commission are supported by substantial evidence 
in the record. The Court should therefore defer to this 
determination of fact and uphold the decision denying benefits to 
the Petitioner. 
DATED this 3% day of January, 1994. 
i i~. 
DAVID L. CHURCH 
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent 
Utah Local Government Trust 
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ADDENDUM A 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Jennie M. Featherstone, * 
* 
Applicant, * 
vs. * 
* 
Tooele Valley Regional and/or * 
Utah Local Government Trust and * 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund, * 
* 
Respondents. * 
********************************* 
The Industrial Commission of Utah issues this order pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-78 and Section 63-46b-12. 
The applicant timely filed this motion for review of the 
administrative law judge's ("ALJ") order dated November 20, 1992• 
Said order denied the applicant's claim for workers' compensation 
benefits pursuant to an alleged July 15, 1991 industrial accident. 
The applicant asserts that the ALJ improperly based his 
decision on credibility when the testimony of the applicant and her 
witnesses was not contradicted by other witnesses or other evidence 
in the record. She further asserts that the ALJ's findings of fact 
are clearly erroneous and are not supported by the evidence in the 
record. 
Under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), an 
ALJ's findings of fact will be sustained if the findings are 
supported by "substantial evidence when viewed in light of the 
whole record before the court." U.C.A. 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1992). 
Substantial evidence is "more than a mere 'scintilla' of evidence 
... though "something less than the weight of the evidence." Grace 
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63 (Ut. App. 1989) 
quoting Consolo v. FMC, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). In its 
discussion of review of agency factfinding, the court noted that it 
would "not substitute its judgment as between two reasonable 
conflicting views," even if the court may have reached a different 
conclusion had the matter come before them on de novo review. 
Grace Drilling at 68. 
We will apply the substantial evidence test to the ALJ's 
findings of fact, recognizing that the ALJ was present at the 
hearing and was better able to observe the testimony and demeanor 
of the witnesses and to evaluate their credibility than the 
commission on its review of the record. We have reviewed the tape 
of the hearing in order to better assess the conformity of the 
ALJ's findings with the taped testimony. 
Review of the medical records exhibit shows that the applicant 
had a history of shoulder pain prior to July 15, 1991, the date of 
the alleged industrial accident. Medical Records Exhibit, pp. 
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00027, 00033, 00045, 00053, 00056, 00058, 00101, 00118, 00119, 
00122. Dr. Mark Greene, however, opined that the applicant's 
rotator cuff injury which has been attributed to the alleged July 
15, 1991 industrial accident, was different from the applicant's 
1987 shoulder pain and bursitis. Medical Records Exhibit, p. 
00001. 
The progress notes of Dr. David E. Curtis, the applicant's 
treating physician, make reference to the applicant's "recurrent" 
right shoulder pain. Medical Records Exhibit, p. 00027. Dr. 
Curtis offered no opinion regarding the causal connection between 
the applicant's rotator cuff tear and her employment, although he 
did note that the applicant believed that her injury was associated 
with "more heavy work at her dishwashing job, especially taking 
care of the trays which come from the jail." Medical Records 
Exhibit, p. 00033. It is important to note that the applicant's 
medical records indicate that she suffered the pain, popping and 
grinding in her shoulder that she attributes to the industrial 
accident before the alleged accident occurred. Medical Records 
Exhibit, p. 00027. 
At the hearing, the applicant testified that on July 15, 1991, 
she picked up 12 serving trays to place them in the dishwasher and 
felt extreme pain "like her arm was being pulled out of the 
socket." She told Food Services Manager Greg Coburn that her arm 
hurt and she needed to go see her doctor. Later that day, the 
applicant saw her treating physician, Dr. Curtis. Dr. Curtis 
diagnosed a rotator cuff tear, but did not tell the applicant that 
the injury predated the July 15, 1991 incident. With regard to 
seeing Dr. Green for a second opinion, the applicant testified that 
he told her that the 1991 rotator cuff injury was different from 
her preceding shoulder problems. Dr. Green gave the applicant no 
recommended course of treatment that she could recall, but she 
testified that she "told him what she needed to have done and he 
did it." Hearing Tape # 1 at 1275. 
In addition, the applicant testified that she talked to Greg 
and her supervisor, Opal West, on July 15, 1991 after the alleged 
industrial accident. On cross examination, the applicant stated 
that she believed she had been treated for arthritis in her 
shoulder with cortisone shots prior to the accident. She testified 
that prior to July 15, 1991, she suffered from severe shoulder 
pain, popping and grinding. However, she didn't remember telling 
Dr. Curtis about the pain, grinding and popping during her June 20, 
1991 visit to the doctor. See Medical Records Exhibit at 00027. 
The applicant further testified that when she suffered an 
industrial injury to her low back in April 1991, she filled out an 
accident report and reported to the emergency room per hospital 
policy. On July 15, 1991, however, she claimed that her shoulder 
Jennie Featherstone 
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"hurt too much" and she didn't think about filling out an accident 
report or going to the emergency room. Instead, she left work 
early at about 9:00 a.m. to see her treating physician, Dr. Curtis. 
The applicant stated that she initially thought her shoulder pain 
was caused by arthritis, but later after she discovered there were 
torn ligaments, she decided the injury must have resulted from 
lifting the trays at work. 
Penny Manchester, one of the applicant's co-workers, testified 
that the applicant asked her to work for her on July 15, 1991. The 
applicant appeared to be in a great deal of pain and was crying 
when she asked Ms. Manchester to work for her. Ms. Manchester also 
testified that Opal West was working on July 15, 1991. 
Charles Featherstone, the applicant's husband of three years, 
testified that before the alleged accident of July 15, 1991, the 
applicant kept the house clean and always had supper ready when he 
came home. After the accident, the house wasn't clean and supper 
was "soup and sandwiches." Mr. Featherstone stated that his wife 
seemed to be in more pain after July 15, 1991 than she was before 
that date. He did not go with his wife to her June and July 1991 
appointments with Dr. Curtis, so he did not know what the doctor 
told her. 
Marilyn Beesley, an insurance adjuster for the Utah Local 
Government Trust, testified that she was the adjuster for the 
applicant's April 16, 1991 lower back industrial claim. She 
received a request for approval of shoulder surgery to be charged 
to the April 16, 1991 claim. Payment for the surgery was denied by 
letter dated August 6, 1991 because there was nothing in her file 
on the April 16, 1991 accident to support payment for the shoulder 
surgery. The applicant called Ms. Beesley on August 7, 1991 to 
request that she reconsider the denial of benefits. During this 
conversation, the applicant did not mention a second accident in 
July 1991. Ms. Beesley talked to the respondent in early August to 
find out how the shoulder injury related to the accident in April 
1991. The employer representative, Beth Bowles, indicated that she 
did not know why the applicant had surgery. An employer's first 
report of injury for the alleged July 15, 1991 accident was 
received by the carrier on August 30, 1991. 
Greg Coburn, the Director of Materials Management and Food 
Services for the respondent testified that the applicant did not 
tell him on July 15, 1991 that she had an industrial accident but 
told him that her shoulder and arm hurt and she needed to leave. 
The applicant had not mentioned her shoulder pain to him prior to 
July 15, 1991. Mr. Coburn testified that Opal West was not working 
on July 15, 1991. He stated that Opal regularly had Mondays off, 
and that July 15, 1991 was a Monday. He also checked the work 
schedule which showed that Opal was off that day and that Diane 
Jennie Featherstone 
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Moore was the supervisor on July 15, 1991. Mr. Coburn saw the 
applicant on August 29, 1991 when she came in to file an employer's 
first report of injury. On cross examination, Mr. Coburn stated 
that he did not fill out an incident report on July 15, 1991 
because the applicant did not tell him the injury was industrially 
related. 
Diane Moore, the applicant's supervisor on July 15, 1991 
testified that she wasn't at work when the alleged accident 
occurred, but came to work at about 9:00 a.m. that day. The 
applicant came to her and told her that her shoulder and arm ached 
and she needed to go to the doctor. Prior to the date of the 
accident Ms. Moore and the applicant had discussed the applicant's 
shoulder pain which was attributed to arthritis. Ms. Moore further 
testified that she didn't fill out an incident report because the 
applicant did not say that she had suffered an industrial accident. 
On August 29, 1991, Gary Coburn called Ms. Moore and told her to 
help the applicant fill out an incident report for the alleged July 
15, 1991 industrial accident. 
We find that there is substantial evidence in the record to 
support the ALJ's findings on the credibility of witnesses and the 
compensability of the alleged industrial accident of July 15, 1991. 
The evidence in the record shows that the applicant complained of 
shoulder and arm pain on July 15, 1991 and left work to seek 
medical attention. Testimony of Jennie Featherstone, Penny 
Manchester, Greg Coburn, Diane Moore. The symptoms that the 
applicant attributes to the industrial accident were present before 
the alleged accident of July 15, 1991. Medical Records Exhibit, p. 
00027. The accident was not immediately reported as industrially 
caused and was not reported to the employer as an industrial 
accident until the claim for benefits based upon the applicant's 
April 16, 1991 industrial accident was denied. Testimony of Jennie 
Featherstone, Greg Coburn, Diane Moore. There were no witnesses to 
the alleged accident and the accident was not reported to any of 
the applicant's co-workers. Testimony of Jennie Featherstone, Greg 
Coburn, Diane Moore, Penny Manchester. The applicant's treating 
physician attributed her complaints to a recurrent condition for 
which she had previously sought treatment on June 20, 1991. 
Medical Records Exhibit, p. 00027. Therefore, the evidence in the 
record does not support a finding that the applicant was injured in 
a compensable industrial accident on July 15, 1991. 
ORDER: 
IT IS ORDERED that the Order of the administrative law judge 
dated November 30, 1992 is hereby affirmed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah 
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Court of Appeals within 3 0 days of the date of this order, pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53 (2) , 35-1-86, 63-46b-16, 
and Bonded Bicycle Couriers v. Dept. of Employment Security et al«, 
201 Utah Adv. Rep. 79. (CA, 12/04/92). The requesting party shall 
bear all costs to prepare a transcript of the hearing for appeals 
purposes. (^  f\ 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
CSlleen S. Colton 
Commissioner 
Certified t h i s ^ ^ day of £? 
sfiz+^D (0 
Patricia O. Ashtoy 
Commission Secretary 
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 92-079 
JENNIE M. FEATHERSTONE, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
TOOELE VALLEY REGIONAL and/or 
UTAH LOCAL GOVERNMENT TRUST 
and/ EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE 
FUND, 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
HEARING: Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah on June 
12, 1992 at 1:00 o'clock p.m. Said hearing 
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
The Honorable Donald L. George, Administrative Law 
Judge. 
The applicant, Jennie Featherstone, was present and 
represented by David Parker, Attorney at Law. 
The defendant employer, Tooele Valley Regional, and 
its insurer, Utah Local Government Trust were 
represented by David L. Church, Attorney at Law. 
The Employers' Reinsurance Fund was represented by 
its Administrator, Erie V. Boorman, Attorney at 
Law. 
An Application for Hearing requesting medical expenses, 
permanent partial and temporary partial disability compensation, 
interest, travel expenses and reserving the issue of permanent and 
total disability was filed with the Industrial Commission of Utah 
on December 31, 1991, wherein the applicant, Jennie M. 
Featherstone, alleges that she sustained an injury by accident 
arising out of or in the course of her employment with the 
defendant employer, Tooele Valley Regional, on July 15, 1991. That 
Application was assigned case number 92-079, a copy was sent to the 
defendant employer, an Answer thereto timely filed, and accordingly 
the matter was scheduled for hearing before the Industrial 
Commission of Utah on June 12, 1992. 
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Beyond the benefits applied for, the defendants' position was 
that no industrial accident had occurred, and in the alternative, 
if an industrial accident were found, legal causation would have to 
be overcome as well. Credibility was deemed to be a major issue. 
The applicant testified that on the day of the alleged 
industrial accident, July 15, 1991, she was working at her job as 
a dishwasher for Tooele Valley Regional. She stated that she moved 
12 trays (which are weighed at 1 pound 13 ounces each) and felt a 
stabbing pain in her arm and shoulder. 
Later when her supervisor, Greg came in, she was reportedly 
crying, he asked what was wrong and she said she had to go to the 
doctor. 
Previous to this in April, 1991, the applicant had another 
industrial accident where she picked up a tray of milk in a walk-in 
freezer, hurt her low back, and reported that. 
Dr. Curtis treated her for this July accident by telling her 
to take a few days off. When she returned to work around the end 
of October or the end of November, she asked for and was put on as 
a "cold cook" but represented that she was not able to handle it 
for more than 4 days because lifting above her head was necessary 
and she couldn't do it. She stated that she could not .return to 
dishwashing because it was too hard on her arm. 
On July 30, 1991, she reports surgery for a rotator cuff 
repair, but still complained of pain after that procedure. 
The applicant specifically stated that on the date of the 
industrial accident, in addition to talking to supervisor, Greg, 
she had also talked to her direct supervisor, Opal, about the 
incident, but no report was filled out. 
On cross-examination, the applicant acknowledged shoulder 
problems prior to 1987. She also at first did not recall an 
appointment with Dr. Curtis for this condition on June 20, 1991, 
then acknowledged that she did. As to her July 15, 1991, visit 
with Dr. Curtis, the medical records do not show any notations 
indicating an industrial accident. The applicant acknowledged 
filing out an industrial accident claim for the April, 1991, 
incident, and stated that on July 15, 1991, no report was made out 
because she was in too much pain. 
The applicant admitted that her leg pain was what prevented 
her from doing the "cold cook" job, not her shoulder. The 
applicant disagreed with Dr. Curtis7 notes after the surgery which 
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indicated that she had full range of motion and good strength. 
When she went to Dr. Greene for a second opinion, she stated that 
he did not relate to her pain. 
The applicant admitted knowing the reporting procedure, 
because it had been explained to her and because she had done so on 
the prior industrial accident. 
In support of her application, the applicant called as a 
second witness, Penny Manchester, who did not witness the 
industrial accident, but said the applicant approached her on that 
day, told the witness that her arm was hurting and asked Manchester 
to work for her, to which she agreed. Manchester's testimony shed 
no light, and appeared to be straining to support the applicant's 
position. 
The applicant presented her husband as her third and final 
witness, who acknowledged that his wife had arthritis, and recited 
a litany of worsened symptoms after the alleged industrial 
accident. He was however, clearly biased, argumentative, exhibited 
selective favorable recall, was angry with Dr. Curtis for allegedly 
not turning in the industrial accident reporting paper work until 
a month and a half after, thereby damaging the applicant's cause; 
he also disagreed with Dr. Curtis of full range of motion. 
The defendants presented as their first witness, insurance 
adjuster, Marilyn Beesley, who had talked with the applicant on 
August 7, 1991, when the applicant called Beesley about her denial 
letter to Dr. Curtis on August 6th. In that conversation, the 
applicant was requesting Beesley to reconsider her denial, and 
stated that her shoulder was giving her the problem all along 
[since the prior industrial accident]. There was no mention of 
July 15th or this alleged second industrial accident. On cross-
examination, Beesley stated that she investigated further, and no 
report had been made to the employer by the applicant concerning 
the July 15th incident. 
The defendant's second witness was Greg Coburn, the director 
of material management and food services who stated that he did 
observe the applicant in tears and that she stated that she could 
not work and left. No industrial accident was reported to him at 
that time, and he was surprised when it was later turned in as an 
industrial accident. 
Coburn testified that contrary to the applicant's statement 
that she had reported this injury to Opal West on July 15th, which 
was a Monday, Opal West did not work on Mondays, and when he 
checked specifically as to the July 15th time sheet, West was off. 
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Defendant's third witness was Diane Moore, who was the 
applicant's direct supervisor on the date of the alleged injury. 
She testified that the applicant did approach her around 9:30 or 
10:00 a.m., and stated that she had to leave to go to the doctor 
because her shoulder and arm ached. The applicant did not say 
anything about an industrial accident at that time, and had 
previously complained of shoulder pain, and taken time off. 
On cross-examination, it was brought up that the applicant had 
complained to Moore several times of her arm hurting because of 
arthritis, but on August 29th, the applicant reported it as an 
industrial accident. 
Testimony ended. 
Having reviewed the file, the exhibits, and further having had 
an opportunity to observe the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, 
the Administrative is now prepared to make the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. The applicant had problems with her right arm and shoulder 
long before the alleged industrial accident of July 15, 1991, 
complained of it to the doctors, and received treatments which 
included shots up to five years previous. The medical records on 
page 101, dated May 22, 1991, indicate increasing shoulder pain. 
That is followed on June 20, 1991, by the notation that the 
applicant " . . . has complained of this over the past 3 years." 
2. The applicant knew the industrial accident reporting 
system well, having done so previously on February 11, 1985, when 
she cut her finger; December 21, 1984, when she burned her 
forearm; November 7, 1990, when she cut her finger on a pot, and 
the last mentioned incident of April 16, 1991, where she allegedly 
hurt her back. Yet, when she claims to have an unwitnessed 
industrial accident on July 15, 1991, by her own testimony, she did 
not report to Greg. She did, however, claim that she reported it 
to Opal, who was not even present on that day (to the detriment of 
the applicant's credibility), further the applicant did not mention 
an industrial accident in her visit to Dr. Curtis that same day, 
nor did she follow through in reporting the matter at all until 
August 29th or after, when she had been denied medical expenses. 
3. The applicant was released to return to work on November 
4, 1991, but chose to retire on 11/10/91, and admitted that her leg 
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pain was what prevented her from doing the "cold cook" work, not 
her shoulder. Further, on November 14, 1991, the applicant applied 
for unemployment benefits, stating only that she had back and leg 
pain, with no mention of her shoulder. 
4. The applicant admitted that she told supervisor Greg 
Coburn that it was arthritis, and an x-ray report of July 18, 1991, 
does show degenerative joint disease. 
5. Considering all the foregoing, the Administrative Law 
Judge finds that the applicant is not a credible witness. 
6. As to the applicant's second witness, Penny Manchester, 
factually she added nothing, but was obviously attempting to 
support the applicant's cause, but not convincingly. 
7. The applicant's husband was an antagonistic,, biased 
witness on the applicant's behalf, argumentative, attacking Dr. 
Curtis on various grounds, and having bursts of sudden favorable 
recall. His testimony is neither credible nor reliable. 
8. The ALJ finds the defense witnesses to be more credible 
than those of the applicant. Their testimony and the medical 
records are clear that the applicant had previously existing 
problems with her arm and shoulder, and when she left on the day of 
the alleged industrial incident, she gave no indication whatsoever 
that this was an industrial accident, and thereafter did not report 
it as such for another 6 weeks. 
9. There is no connection between the applicant's shoulder 
problem and the alleged industrial accident of July 15, 1991, nor 
with the applicant's prior industrial injury of April, 1991, nor 
her low back problems. 
10. The applicant was not involved in a compensable industrial 
accident on July 15, 1991. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The applicant, Jennie M. Featherstone, has failed to show by 
a preponderance of credible evidence that an industrial accident 
occurred on July 15, 1991, and accordingly she is not entitled to 
workers compensation benefits. 
Good cause appearing herein, the Administrative Law Judge 
hereby issues the following: 
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ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the claim of the applicant, 
Jennie M. Featherstone, for medical expenses, temporary total 
disability, temporary partial disability, permanent partial 
disability, interest, travel and permanent total disability 
benefits as a result of a July 15, 1991, incident, should be and 
the same is hereby denied and dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (3 0) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
(J 
Donald L. George 
Administrative Law Judge 
Certified this ,j^c?jzD day o f ^ K ^ i e . 1992. 
ATTEST: 
S 
<& /Ar. ^<^ 
Patricia O. Ashb} 
Commission Secretary, 
* % % % « « * * • 
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I hereby certify that on the ^ Y y day of November, 1992, the 
attached ORDER in the case of Jennie M. Featherstone was mailed, 
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Jennie M. Featherstone 
428 E 300 N 
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David W. Parker, Atty 
180 S 300 W #260 
Salt Lake City UT 84101 
Utah Local Governments Insurance 
5460 E 200 S #200 
Salt Lake City UT 84102-2020 
David L. Church, Atty 
51 E 400 S #200 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Erie V. Boorman, Atty 
ERF 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Jund S. Harrisori, Paralegal ~ 
Adjudication Division 
/jsh 
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ADDENDUM C 
ORDER ON REMAND 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
P.O. Box 146600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600 
Jennie M. Featherstone, * 
* 
Applicant, * 
vs. * 
Tooele Valley Regional and/or * 
Utah Local Government Trust and * 
Employers'' Reinsurance Fund, * 
Respondents. * 
********************************* 
This matter was remanded to the Industrial Commission 
("commission") by the Court of Appeals on October 28, 1993 for the 
limited purpose of determining whether petitioner has shown by a 
preponderance of the evidence that she is entitled to compensation. 
The applicant filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits 
based upon an alleged July 15, 1991 industrial accident. An 
administrative law judge of the commission ("ALJ") denied benefits 
based in part on credibility determinations he made at the hearing. 
We affirmed the ALJ's order based upon our determination that there 
was substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and order. The Court of 
Appeals has held that we must apply the preponderance of the 
evidence standard in our review of administrative law judge ("ALJ") 
decisions.1 
We will now review the evidence in the record to determine 
whether the applicant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence 
that she suffered a compensable industrial accident on July 15, 
1993. 
DISCUSSION: 
Review of the medical records exhibit shows that the applicant 
had a history of shoulder pain prior to July 15, 1991, the date of 
the alleged industrial accident. Medical Records Exhibit, pp. 
00027, 00033, 00045, 00053, 00056, 00058, 00101, 00118, 00119, 
00122. Dr. Mark Greene, however, opined that the applicant's 
rotator cuff injury which has been attributed to the alleged July 
15, 1991 industrial accident, was different from the applicant's 
1987 shoulder pain and bursitis. Medical Records Exhibit, p. 
00001. 
The progress notes of Dr. David E. Curtis, the applicant's 
1
 Ashcroft v. Industrial Commission, 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 (Ut. 
App. 1993) . 
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treating physician, make reference to the applicant's "recurrent" 
right shoulder pain. Medical Records Exhibit, p. 00027. Dr. 
Curtis offered no opinion regarding the causal connection between 
the applicant's rotator cuff tear and her employment, although he 
did note that the applicant believed that her injury was associated 
with "more heavy work at her dishwashing job, especially taking 
care of the trays which come from the jail." Medical Records 
Exhibit, p. 00033. It is important to note that the applicant's 
medical records indicate that she suffered the pain, popping and 
grinding in her shoulder that she attributes to the industrial 
accident before the alleged accident occurred. Medical Records 
Exhibit, p. 00027. 
At the hearing, the applicant testified that on July 15, 1991, 
she picked up 12 serving trays to place them in the dishwasher and 
felt extreme pain "like her arm was being pulled out of the 
socket." She told Food Services Manager Greg Coburn that her arm 
hurt and she needed to go see her doctor. Later that day, the 
applicant saw her treating physician, Dr. Curtis. Dr. Curtis 
diagnosed a rotator cuff tear, but did not tell the applicant that 
the injury predated the July 15, 1991 incident. With regard to 
seeing Dr. Green for a second opinion, the applicant testified that 
he told her that the 1991 rotator cuff injury was different from 
her preceding shoulder problems. Dr. Green gave the applicant no 
recommended course of treatment that she could recall, but she 
testified that she "told him what she needed to have done and he 
did it." Hearing Tape # 1 at 1275. 
In addition, the applicant testified that she talked to Greg 
and her supervisor, Opal West, on July 15, 1991 after the alleged 
industrial accident. On cross examination, the applicant stated 
that she believed she had been treated for arthritis in her 
shoulder with cortisone shots prior to the accident. She testified 
that prior to July 15, 1991, she suffered from severe shoulder 
pain, popping and grinding. However, she didn't remember telling 
Dr. Curtis about the pain, grinding and popping during her June 20, 
1991 visit to the doctor. See Medical Records Exhibit at 00027. 
The applicant further testified that when she suffered an 
industrial injury to her low back in April 1991, she filled out an 
accident report and reported to the emergency room per hospital 
policy. On July 15, 1991, however, she claimed that her shoulder 
"hurt too much" and she didn't think about filling out an accident 
report or going to the emergency room. Instead, she left work 
early at about 9:00 a.m. to see her treating physician, Dr. Curtis. 
The applicant stated that she initially thought her shoulder pain 
was caused by arthritis, but later after she discovered there were 
torn ligaments, she decided the injury must have resulted from 
lifting the trays at work. 
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Penny Manchester, one of the applicant's co-workers, testified 
that the applicant asked her to work for her on July 15, 1991. The 
applicant appeared to be in a great deal of pain and was crying 
when she asked Ms. Manchester to work for her. Ms. Manchester also 
testified that Opal West was working on July 15, 1991. 
Charles Featherstone, the applicant's husband of three years, 
testified that before the alleged accident of July 15, 1991, the 
applicant kept the house clean and always had supper ready when he 
came home. After the accident, the house wasn't clean and supper 
was "soup and sandwiches." Mr. Featherstone stated that his wife 
seemed to be in more pain after July 15, 1991 than she was before 
that date. He did not go with his wife to her June and July 1991 
appointments with Dr. Curtis, so he did not know what the doctor 
told her. 
Marilyn Beesley, an insurance adjuster for the Utah Local 
Government Trust, testified that she was the adjuster for the 
applicant's April 16, 1991 lower back industrial claim. She 
received a request for approval of shoulder surgery to be charged 
to the April 16, 1991 claim. Payment for the surgery was denied by 
letter dated August 6, 1991 because there was nothing in her file 
on the April 16, 1991 accident to support payment for the shoulder 
surgery. The applicant called Ms. Beesley on August 7, 1991 to 
request that she reconsider the denial of benefits. During this 
conversation, the applicant did not mention a second accident in 
July 1991. Ms. Beesley talked to the respondent in early August to 
find out how the shoulder injury related to the accident in April 
1991. The employer representative, Beth Bowles, indicated that she 
did not know why the applicant had surgery. An employer's first 
report of injury for the alleged July 15, 1991 accident was 
received by the carrier on August 30, 1991. 
Greg Coburn, the Director of Materials Management and Food 
Services for the respondent testified that the applicant did not 
tell him on July 15, 1991 that she had an industrial accident but 
told him that her shoulder and arm hurt and she needed to leave. 
The applicant had not mentioned her shoulder pain to him prior to 
July 15, 1991. Mr. Coburn testified that Opal West was not working 
on July 15, 1991. He stated that Opal regularly had Mondays off, 
and that July 15, 1991 was a Monday. He also checked the work 
schedule which showed that Opal was off that day and that Diane 
Moore was the supervisor on July 15, 1991. Mr. Coburn saw the 
applicant on August 29, 1991 when she came in to file an employer's 
first report of injury. On cross examination, Mr. Coburn stated 
that he did not fill out an incident report on July 15, 1991 
because the applicant did not tell him the injury was industrially 
related. 
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Diane Moore, the applicants supervisor on July 15, 1991 
testified that she wasn't at work when the alleged accident 
occurred, but came to work at about 9:00 a.m. that day. The 
applicant came to her and told her that her shoulder and arm ached 
and she needed to go to the doctor. Prior to the date of the 
accident Ms. Moore and the applicant had discussed the applicant's 
shoulder pain which was attributed to arthritis. Ms. Moore further 
testified that she didn't fill out an incident report because the 
applicant did not say that she had suffered an industrial accident. 
On August 29, 1991, Gary Coburn called Ms. Moore and told her to 
help the applicant fill out an incident report for the alleged July 
15, 1991 industrial accident. 
The ALJ determined that the applicant was not credible based 
upon his observation of the witnesses and the inconsistencies 
between the applicant's testimony and the evidence contained in the 
medical records. The ALJ further found that Penny Manchester added 
no factual support to the applicant's case and that the applicant's 
husband was an antagonistic, biased and argumentative witness who 
was neither credible nor reliable. 
In Vali Convelescent and Care Institutions v. Div. of Health 
Care Financing, 797 P. 2d 438 (Utah App. 1990) , the Court of Appeals 
cited with approval an Idaho case dealing with credibility 
determinations by a hearing officer of an administrative agency. 
The Idaho court noted 
where credibility is crucial and where first-
hand exposure to the witnesses may strongly 
affect the outcome, we think the Personnel 
Commission should not override the hearing 
officer's impressions unless it makes a cogent 
explanation of its reasons for doing so. Such 
an explanation is essential to meaningful 
judicial review . . . 
Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Sandoval, 742 P. 2d 992, 996 (Ct. App. 
1987) cited in Vali at 449. 
We will only overturn an ALJ's findings of fact if there is a 
compelling reason to do so, especially when the factual issues turn 
on questions of witness credibility. In this case, we find no 
compelling reason to overrule the ALJ's findings of fact. We 
therefore conclude that the ALJ's findings of fact and conclusions 
of law are well supported by a preponderance of the evidence in the 
record and hereby adopt them as our own. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
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For the reasons outlined above, we find that the applicant has 
failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she injured 
her right shoulder in a compensable industrial accident on July 15, 
1991. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED t h a t t h e Order of t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
law judge d a t e d November 30 , 1992 isp^hereby a^f formed. 
DATED THISN:?ft DAY OF NOVEMBER, S t e p h e n , M. H a d l e f y , \ 
1993. "  Ch^ri ia i i ' J , v \ 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
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A D D E N D U M D 
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63-4Gb-8. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings 
— Hearing procedure. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsections 63-46b-3(d)(i) and (ii), in all formal 
adjudicative proceedings, a hearing shall be conducted as follows: 
(a) The presiding officer shall regulate the course of the hearing to 
obtain full disclosure of relevant facts and to afford all the parties reason-
able opportunity to present their positions. 
(b) On his own motion or upon objection by a party, the presiding offi-
cer: 
(i) may exclude evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly 
repetitious; 
(ii) shall exclude evidence privileged in the courts of Utah; 
(iii) may receive documentary evidence in the form of a copy or 
excerpt if the copy or excerpt contains all pertinent portions of the 
original document; 
(iv) may take official notice of any facts that could be judicially 
noticed under the Utah Rules of Evidence, of the record of other 
proceedings before the agency, and of technical or scientific facts 
within the agency's specialized knowledge. 
(c) The presiding officer may not exclude evidence solely because it is 
hearsay. 
(d) The presiding officer shall afford to all parties the opportunity to 
present evidence, argue, respond, conduct cross-examination, and submit 
rebuttal evidence. 
(e) The presiding officer may give persons not a party to the adjudica-
tive proceeding the opportunity to present oral or written statements at 
the hearing. 
(0 All testimony presented at the hearing, if offered as evidence to be 
considered in reaching a decision on the merits, shall be given under oath. 
(g) The hearing shall be recorded at the agency's expense. 
(h) Any party, at his own expense, may have a person approved by the 
agency prepare a transcript of the hearing, subject to any restrictions that 
the agency is permitted by statute to impose to protect confidential infor-
mation disclosed at the hearing. 
(i) All hearings shall be open to all parties. 
(2) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from taking appro-
priate measures necessary to preserve the integrity of the hearing. 
History: C. 1953, G3-46l>-8, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 161, § 204; 1988, ch. 72, § 19. 
Cross-References. — Judicial notice, Utah 
It. Evid. 201. 
Privileges, Utah It. Evid. 501 et seq. 
A D D E N D U M E 
U T A H O O D E AJSritf - § 6 3 — 4 6 f c > — X O 
63-46b-10. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceed-
ings — Orders. 
In formal adjudicative proceedings: 
(1) Within a reasonable time after the hearing, or after the filing of any 
post-hearing papers permitted by the presiding officer, or within the time 
required by any applicable statute or rule of the agency, the presiding 
officer shall sign and issue an order that includes: 
(a) a statement of the presiding officer's findings of fact based ex-
clusively on the evidence of record in the adjudicative proceedings or 
on facts officially noted; 
(b) a statement of the presiding officer's conclusions of law; 
(c) a statement of the reasons for the presiding officer's decision; 
(d) a statement of any relief ordered by the agency; 
(e) a notice of the right to apply for reconsideration; 
(0 a notice of any right to administrative or judicial review of the 
order available to aggrieved parties; and 
(g) the time limits applicable to any reconsideration or review. 
(2) The presiding officer may use his experience, technical competence, 
and specialized knowledge to evaluate the evidence. 
(3) No finding of fact that was contested may be based solely on hear-
say evidence unless that evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. 
(4) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from issuing 
interim orders to: 
(a) notify the parties of further hearings; 
(b) notify the parties of provisional rulings on a portion of the 
issues presented; or 
(c) otherwise provide for the lair and efficient conduct of the adju-
dicative proceeding. 
History: ( \ 1953, OTMGb-10, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 101, * 206; 1988, ch. 72, $ 20. 
A D D E N D U M F 
U T A H C O D E A N N . § 6 3 — 4 6fc>— X 2 
(J3-4Gb-12. Agency review — Procedure. 
(1) (a) If a statute or the agency's rules permit parties to any adjudicative 
proceeding to seek review of an order by the agency or by a superior 
agency, the aggrieved parly may Hie a written request for review within 
30 days after the issuance of the order with the person or entity desig-
nated for that purpose by the statute or rule. 
(b) The request shall: 
(i) be signed by the party seeking review; 
(ii) state the grounds for review and the relief requested; 
(iii) state the date upon which it was mailed; and 
(iv) be sent by mail to the presiding officer and to each party. 
(2) Within 15 days of the mailing date of the request for review, or within 
the time period provided by agency rule, whichever is longer, any party may 
file a response with the person designated by statute or rule to receive the 
response. One copy of the response shall be sent by mail to each of the parties 
and to the presiding officer. 
(3) If a statute or the agency's rules require review of an order by the 
agency or a superior agency, the agency or superior agency shall review the 
order within a reasonable time or within the time required by statute or the 
agency's rules. 
(4) To assist in review, the agency or superior agency may by order or rule 
permit the parties to file briefs or other papers, or to conduct oral argument. 
(5) Notice of hearings on review shall be mailed to all parties. 
(G) (a) Within a reasonable time after the filing of any response, other 
filings, or oral argument, or within Ihe time requited by statute or appli-
cable rules, the agency or superior agency shall issue a written order on 
review. 
(b) The order on review shall be signed by the agency head or by a 
person designated by the agency for that purpose and shall be mailed to 
each parly. 
(c) The older on review shall contain: 
(i) a designation of the statute or rule permitting or requiring re-
view; 
(ii) a statement ol* the issues reviewed; 
(iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues reviewed; 
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the issues reviewed; 
(v) the reasons for the disposition: 
(vi) whether the decision of the1 presiding officer or agency is to be 
affirmed, leversed, or modified, and whether all or any portion of the 
adjudicative proceeding is to be remanded; 
(vii) a notice of any right oi further administrative reconsideration 
or judicial leview available to aggrieved parties; and 
(viii) the time limits applicable to any appeal or review. 
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63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
(i) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of 
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required 
by the appellate rules of (he appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern 
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial 
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, sum-
marize, or organize the record; 
(h) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and 
copies for the recoul: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to 
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substan-
tially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action 
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any stat-
ute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-mak-
ing process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a 
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or 
implied bv the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agencv action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contiary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justi-
fies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a 
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
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